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REDEMPTION?1
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak
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The economic crisis which started in 2008 led to a strong rise in public debts.
The sovereign debt crisis in euro area southern countries broke the unity of the
euro area and weakened the “single currency” concept. The paper shows that
this situation is not due to a lack of fiscal discipline in Europe, but to drifts in
financial capitalism and to an inappropriately designed euro area economic
policy framework. Public debts homogeneity needs to be resettled in Europe.
European public debts should become safe assets again, and should not be
subject to financial markets’ assessment. EU Member States should not be
requested to pay for past sins through austerity measures, and should not
strengthen fiscal discipline through rules lacking economic rationale. The paper
deals with recent proposals made to improve euro area governance (redemption
fund, European Treasury, eurobonds, public debt guarantee by the ECB). The
paper advocates for a full guarantee of government bonds for the Member States
who commit to an economic policy coordination process, which should target
GDP growth and coordinated reduction of imbalances. 
Keywords: EU fiscal policy, EU governance. 
The 2008 crisis led to a strong rise in public debts, by around
30 percentage points of GDP in terms of Maastricht debt for the
euro area, 50 percentage points for the UK, 45 for the US, 60 for
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Japan (Table 1). At the end of 2013, almost all euro area countries
will run higher than 60% of GDP public debts. This is also the case
for the UK, Japan, and the US.
There is no specificity in the euro area as a whole. However,
public debts rose very strongly in some countries: Ireland (by
100 percentage points), Greece (by 70 percentage points), Portugal
and Spain (by 55 percentage points). 
Over the crisis, monetary policies have become strongly expan-
sionary, with central banks’ interest rates having been cut down to
almost 0. In view of the depth of the recession, markets expect
interest rates to remain durably low, and hence long-term interest
rates have fallen (Figure 1). Thus, the 10-year government bond
rate decreased from 4.6% in 2007 to 1.8% in 2012 in the US, from
5% to 1.9% in the UK, from 1.7% to 0.8% in Japan, despite the rise
in public deficits and debts. In the euro area, interest rates fell also
in Germany (from 4.2% to 1.5%), in France (from 4.3% to 2.6%),
but financial markets fearing or betting against sovereign debt
default in Southern economies requested exorbitant interest rates,
Table 1. Public debts in 2007 and 2013
% of GDP
Gross debt, Maastricht definition Net debt
2007 2013 2007 2013
Germany 65 80 43 49
France 64 95 36 73
Italy 103 133 91 117
Spain 36 95 18 67
Netherlands 45 75 27 45
Belgium 84 100 73 83
Austria 60 75 31 51
Greece 107 176 86 123
Portugal 68 128 50 90
Finland 35 58 -73 -52
Ireland 25 124 0 89
Euro area 66 95 43 68
United Kingdom 44 94 26 74
United States 64 105 44 82
Japan 183 243 81 144
Sources: European Commission DG-ECFIN, AMECO, autumn 2013; OECD, Economic Outlook, December 2013.
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i.e. on average in 2012: 5.5% for Italy, 5.9% for Spain, 6.3% for
Ireland, 11% for Portugal, 22.9% for Greece. Markets are self-
fulfilling; these requested interest rates weighing on public
finances stability and economic growth. They break the unity of
the euro area, and destroy the “single currency” notion: a Spanish
company cannot borrow at the same rate as a French one. The
interest rates that European countries have to pay are now condi-
tional to financial markets fears or speculation.
Should States pay back their past sins by a redemption period?
How to re-establish public debt homogeneity within the euro area?
Should States aim to bring debts back to their pre-crisis levels? How
to stop the rise in public debts? The answers to these questions
depend on the diagnosis made on the roots of the crisis: is the crisis
due to a general lack of fiscal discipline, to drifts in financial capi-
talism or to a euro area inappropriate framework? Section 1
criticises the lack of fiscal discipline diagnosis. Section 2 deals with
the drawbacks of the euro area framework. Section 3 discusses the
reforms introduced since the beginning of the crisis: Fiscal Pact,
European Semester, ESM, OMT, consolidation strategy. Section 4
deals with the different recent proposals made with a view to bring
the debt crisis in euro area countries to an end: more federalism, a
Figure 1. 10-year government interest rates
In %
Source: Financial markets, Datastream.
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European redemption fund, a European Treasury, eurobonds,
public debt guarantees by the ECB. It is difficult, not to say impos-
sible, to have simultaneously solidarity and autonomy. We
advocate for a full guarantee of government bonds for the MS who
commit to an economic policy coordination process, which should
target GDP growth and coordinated reduction of imbalances.
1. A lack of fiscal discipline? 
In order to assess public finance management before the crisis,
one must go back to 2007. According to the OECD assessment
released in the June 2008 Economic Outlook, the euro area output
gap was nil in 2007; most euro area countries were close to poten-
tial output. Euro area inflation was stable at 2.1% per annum; the
euro area unemployment rate had come down to 7.4%. In autumn
2012, the OECD revised its assessment: the euro area was now
considered to have been running at over full capacity in 2007 with
a positive output gap of 3.3%. But in 2007, there was no element
on which such an assessment could be based; there was no sign of
such imbalances.
Table 2 shows that in 2007, most Member States (MS) were
running a primary government surplus, i.e. a 1.9% of GDP surplus
for the area as a whole. France and Portugal were the only coun-
tries running a primary balance slightly below the level requested
to stabilise the debt-to-GDP ratio. The euro area primary balance
stood 1.8 percentage point above this level. In fact, some countries
like Spain, Ireland, and even more Greece benefited from very low
interest rates as compared to their robust GDP growth. Their public
debts were stable, but this was fragile, because it was relying on the
spread between interest rates and GDP growth. The crisis led to a
strong and rapid deterioration in government balances, but this
deterioration results from the fall in output. Current public deficits
do not reflect pre-crisis structural fiscal imbalances. 
In 2012, the depth of the recession made it difficult to estimate
potential output growth, if this concept makes any sense, and
hence to assess structural government balance levels. According to
the EC estimates, euro area potential output growth would be 0.5%
only per year in 2012-13 and the euro area output gap would be
-2.3%. All countries except Germany still have to make fiscal
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efforts in order to meet the objective of structural budgets in
balance (Table 3). According to us, under the assumption that the
financial crisis did not affect potential growth, the output gap is
around -11 percentage points of GDP; the objective should be to
run a primary structural budget in balance, which will be sufficient
to stabilise the debt-to-GDP ratio, if the interest rate equals (or is
lower than) the nominal GDP growth rate. Under the assumption
that countries will be able to recover half of the output loss due to
the crisis (Table 3, column 4), only Spain and Ireland need to make
budgetary efforts, while most MS (Germany, Italy, Greece) run
excessive structural balance surpluses. The priority is to recover the
output lost since the beginning of the crisis. Euro area countries are
in a better fiscal position than the US and Japan. The euro area
does not suffer from past insufficient fiscal discipline. The roots of
the crisis lie in the drift in the wage/profit shares in value added
and in the rise in inequalities which have led some MS to increase
government deficits to support output. Deficits have risen since
Table 2. Public debt stability in 2007
 
Government 
balance,
% of GDP
Primary 
government 
balance, 
% of GDP
Net debt, 
% of GDP
Real interest 
rate less trend 
GDP growth, 
Percentage 
point
Stability gap, 
Percentage 
point
Germany 0.2 2.7 42.5 2.0 1.8
France -2.7 -0.2 35.7 0.3 -0.3
Italy -1.6 3.1 87.1 0.9 2.3
Spain 1.9 3.0 17.7 -2.5 3.4
Netherlands  0.2 1.8 27.8  0.2 1.7
Belgium -0.1 3.6 73.1 0.0 3.6
Austria -1.0 1.0 31.4 0.1 1.0
Greece -6.8 -2.3 82.4 -2.8 0.0
Portugal -3.2 -0.6 49.7 0.5 -0.9
Finland  5.3 4.7 -72.6 0.1 4.8
Ireland  0.1 0.7 -0.3 -4.0 0.7
Euro area -0.7 1.9 40.1 0.3 1.8
United Kingdom -2.8 -0.8 28.3 -0.3 -0.7
United States -2.9 -1.0 48.0 -0.6 -0.7
Japan -2.1 -2.1 80.5  0.9 -2.2
Explanatory note: the stability gap is measured as the difference between the primary government balance and the
balance required to stabilise debt (net debt*long-term interest rate corrected from trend growth). 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook, 2008/1 and 2012/2, authors’ calculations.
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2008 because of the magnitude of the crisis and of the inappro-
priate euro area economic policy framework.
A single monetary policy for countries where GDP growth rates
and inflation rates structurally differ inevitably generates imbal-
ances. Before the crisis, disparities had been growing in the euro
area between two groups of countries implementing unsustainable
macroeconomic strategies: Northern countries (Germany, Austria,
and the Netherlands) implemented neo-mercantilist strategies
which allowed them to accumulate competitiveness gains and
large current surpluses, while Southern economies were accumu-
lating large current account deficits due to robust growth strategies
boosted by negative real interest rates (Deroose et al., 2004;
Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2007). The economic policy framework of
the Maastricht Treaty was unable to prevent the rise in imbalances
which became unsustainable when the crisis burst.
In 2007, several euro area countries were running large current
account surpluses (Table 4): The Netherlands (8.1% of GDP),
Table 3. Government balances in 2012
% of GDP
Gov. balance* Structural balance* (EC)
Primary 
balance*
Structural pri-
mary balance**
Germany 0.1 0.1 1.9 3.0
France -4.8 -3.6 -2.4 0.0
Italy -2.9 -1.3 2.3 5.3
Spain -8.0 -6.0 -4.5 -0.7
Netherlands -4.0 -2.7 -2.8 0.1
Belgium -3.4 -2.7 0.3 2.0
Austria -2.5 -2.4 -0.8 1.0
Portugal -6.5 -4.8 -2.4 0.9
Finland -2.2 -0.8 -1.5 2.5
Ireland -8.1 -7.6 -5.2 -1.2
Greece -7.0 -1.2 -2.1 5.6
Euro area -3.4 -2.3 -0.7 2.1
United Kingdom -8.6 -4.7 -5.8 -2.6
United States -9.3 -7.4 -5.6
Japan -9.5 -8.6 -6.7
*Corrected for one-off measures.
**Authors’ estimates. Assumption: Countries will be able to recover half of the output loss due to the crisis.
Source: European Commission, Winter Forecasts, European Economy, February 2013.
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Germany (7.9%), Finland (4.9%), Belgium (3.5%), and Austria
(3.3%), while other countries were running large deficits: Portugal
(8.5% of GDP), Spain (9.6%), and Greece (12.5%). The 230 billion
euros surplus in Northern economies initiated and financed the
180 billion euros deficit in Mediterranean countries. There is a rela-
tionship in the euro area, between one the one hand “Germany-
Netherlands-Austria” and on the other hand “Spain-Portugal-
Greece” which is similar with the “United States” versus “China”
relationship at the world level and involves similar unsustain-
ability. It raises the same question: how to convince “virtuous”
countries to spend more and increase their real exchange rates so
that “sinner” countries can reduce their external deficits without
depressing domestic output? The financial crisis put the debt accu-
mulation process to an end. 
2. The euro area drawbacks
The single currency suffers from seven original sins, which are
difficult to correct:
Table 4. Current account balances in 2007
 Billion euros % of GDP
Luxembourg 3.8 10.1
Netherlands 48.6 8.1
Germany 192.1 7.9
Finland 7.3 4.9
Belgium 12.8 3.5
Austria 9.1 3.3
Denmark 1.6 0.7
Italy -27.7 -1.7
France -43.0 -2.2
Slovenia -1.6 -4.6
Slovakia -2.8 -4.7
Ireland -10.1 -5.3
Portugal -16.0 -8.5
Spain -105.1 -9.6
Greece -33.4 -12.5
Total 39.4 0.4
Source: IMF.
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— According to economic theory, there cannot be a single
currency between countries with different economic situa-
tions and independent economic policies. The single
currency entails introducing precise, well-defined and
binding constraints, solidarity mechanisms or economic
policy coordination. How to prevent otherwise the emer-
gence and persistence of imbalances between some countries
running large external deficits and some others running
large surpluses? How to handle such situations?
— These mechanisms cannot consist in rigid numerical rules
enshrined in a Treaty (such as: public deficits should not
exceed 3% of GDP, public debts should not exceed 60% of
GDP, structural government budgets in balance in the
medium-term). These mechanisms must be both soft (the
objectives should be agreed between countries accounting
for the current economic context) and binding (everyone
must comply with decisions agreed in common). But how
may governments with necessarily different interests and
analyses reach agreement on economic policy strategies?
How to convince a country to change its economic policy in
order to meet common rules? 
— The rules of the game should have been set by clearly consid-
ering all possibilities of symmetric or specific shocks,
accounting for different objectives. What should be done if a
country wishes to build current account surpluses? What
should be done after a common or a specific shock? How to
define the nature of the shock? But no such rules were settled
and it is difficult for rules to fit all situations. For instance, no
one could imagine in 1997 a situation where monetary
policy would not be able to cut nominal interest rates, where
public debts would have risen due to banking rescue pack-
ages, etc. 
— On the one hand, there cannot be unconditional solidarity
between countries with different social and economic
systems. For example, Northern countries may refuse to
support Southern countries, blaming them for not having
undertaken the necessary structural reforms, for having let
imbalances grow and for being unable to meet their commit-
Redemption? 59
ments. On the other hand, such solidarity is a prerequisite
for the single currency to be guaranteed. 
— According to the EU Constitution, the ECB is not entitled to
finance directly governments (Article 123, TFEU); financial
solidarity between MS is forbidden (Article 125, TFEU). Thus,
each MS has to borrow on financial markets without any
guaranteed support from a central bank acting as a “lender of
last resort”. This raises the risk that some MS may not be able
to fulfil their commitments and may default. MS public debt
is no longer a safe asset. Financial markets started to realise
this from mid-2009. After the experience of the Greek
default, they requested unsustainable interest rates to coun-
tries in difficulty, which increased further their difficulties.
— Euro area MS are now under financial markets’ judgement
and they do not control anymore their interest rates unlike
Anglo-Saxon countries or Japan. But financial markets have
no macroeconomic expertise, they are – and know that they
are – self-fulfilling. However, Northern countries refuse a
collective guarantee of MS public debts. They consider that
the discipline imposed by financial markets is necessary. But
disparity among interest rates is arbitrary and costly. In the
long term, for instance, a country like Italy, with a 2
percentage points interest rates spread with France, would
pay financial markets a premium of around 2.4% of GDP as a
guarantee to an alleged default risk. 
— The 2007-2009 crisis is a deep crisis of financial capitalism,
which would have requested a strong policy response from
governments to reduce the weight of finance and the reli-
ance on public and private debts, to implement a
macroeconomic strategy aiming at full employment (see
Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2009). But European authorities
have denied any questioning of the pre-crisis strategy. This
strategy is based on three postulates: the power of national
governments should be reduced and handed over to Euro-
pean authorities; fiscal policies should be paralysed; growth
should be sought through liberal structural reforms. This
strategy has not delivered so far: the euro area remains in
depression. 
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3. Reforms: the EC strategy
The EC strategy has consisted so far in four pillars:
1) Strengthening fiscal discipline
The Commission persists in saying that the functioning of
single currency requires structurally budgetary positions in
balance. On 29 September 2010, the Commission released a set of
six directives (the Six-Pack) aiming at “strengthening economic
governance”, in other words the SGP fulfilment, without ques-
tioning the relevance of the latter. The Six-Pack contents were
involved in the Fiscal Pact, ratified on 2 March 2012. 
This Pact is a new step forward from liberal views against
Keynesian economic policies and from EU authorities against
domestic fiscal policies. Article 3.1 states that: “The budgetary posi-
tion of the general government shall be balanced or in surplus.
This rule shall be deemed to be respected if the annual structural
balance of the general government is lower than 0.5% of GDP. The
MS shall ensure rapid convergence towards their respective
medium-term objective. The time frame for such convergence will
be proposed by the Commission […]. The MS may temporarily
deviate from their medium-term objective or the adjustment path
towards it only in exceptional circumstances. A correction mecha-
nism shall be triggered automatically in the event of substantial
deviations from the adjustment path. The mechanism shall
include the obligation to implement measures to correct the devia-
tions over a defined period of time”.
Thus, running budgetary positions close to balance is
enshrined in the Pact although it has no economic rationale. The
true “golden rule of public finances” justifies on the contrary that
public investment is financed through borrowing, since invest-
ment expenditure will be used over many years. Besides,
households, insurance companies, financial institutions wish to
own public debt. If the desired public debt stands at around 80%
of GDP and if nominal GDP grows by around 3.5% per annum (i.e.
by 1.75% in volume and 1.75% in prices), it is justified to run a
public deficit of around 2.8% of GDP. Besides, a public deficit is
necessary when it allows reaching a satisfactory demand level
leading to the highest output level not accelerating inflation, at a
real interest rate close to GDP growth. There is no guarantee that
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running a government budget in balance is optimal. Since coun-
tries do not control anymore interest rates and exchange rates,
they need degrees of freedom in the conduct of their fiscal policy. 
The Pact requests MS to converge rapidly towards this objec-
tive, at a pace defined by the Commission, without accounting for
the cyclical context. A temporary deviation would be allowed in
case of exceptional circumstances, if “the deviation from the refer-
ence value results from a negative growth rate or from a cumulated
fall in output over a prolonged weak period of growth as compared
to the potential growth rate” but corrective measures should be
taken rapidly. The Commission refuses to recognise that most euro
area countries have been in such a situation since 2009, and
persists to require the implementation of policies intended to cut
rapidly deficits. 
The Pact is based on the structural deficit notion, i.e.: “deficit
corrected from the cyclical component, excluding one-off and
temporary measures”. But measuring such a deficit is problematic,
especially in the event of strong macroeconomic shocks. In prac-
tice the estimates and methods of the Commission will have to be
used. But they have two drawbacks. First, these estimates are
always close to observed output, since the methods used consider
as structural the fall in capital resulting from the investment fall
during the crisis: this underestimates the cyclical deficit and will
impose pro-cyclical policies. This will oblige MS to implement pro-
cyclical policies, as we could observe since 2010.
Second, the estimates vary strongly over time. Hence, potential
output estimates for 2006 were revised substantially downwards in
2008. In spring 2007, the Commission estimated that there was a
negative output gap of 1% in France in 2006, i.e. the French
economy was operating at below its potential. France had not yet
reached back its potential output level since the 2002-2005 slow-
down. Estimated potential growth for 2008 was 2.3%. In autumn
2011, the Commission considered that France had in 2006 a
significantly positive output gap of 2.3% and that potential growth
in 2008 was 1.6%. The French economy was therefore at a peak of
activity. The potential output level estimate for 2006 was revised
downwards by 3.3%. For 2012, what is the French output gap? The
Commission (spring 2013) estimates it at -2.8%, implying that, due
to the crisis, the French potential growth rate decreased from 2% to
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1.2%. The OECD estimate is -3.4%. If one assumes that the crisis
did not affect potential growth, then the output gap is -8%. With
the Commission's estimates, the French structural government
deficit is 3.1% of GDP in 2012 and therefore France should pursue
at least four years of budgetary efforts of around 0.75% of GDP per
annum. These efforts will weigh on GDP growth and the 1.2%
potential growth estimate will probably be validated. With an
output gap estimate of -8%, the structural deficit is only 0.5% of
GDP, well below the 2.4% of the “true golden rule”; clearly, the
objective today should be to support output so that it reaches its
potential level.
According to paragraph 3d, the structural deficit target can be
lowered to 1% if debt stands below 60% of GDP. Let us consider a
country with GDP growing by 2% per year and inflation rising by
2% per year. If this country runs permanently a 1% of GDP deficit,
its debt will come down to 25% of GDP. But nothing guarantees
that the macroeconomic equilibrium may be ensured with a priori
set values: government debt = 25% of GDP; deficit = 1% of GDP. 
According to article 3.2, MS should introduce in their constitu-
tion the balanced budget rule and an automatic correction
mechanism if the public balance deviates from its target, or, if this
cannot be done, a binding and permanent correction mechanism.
The correction mechanism must be based on principles proposed
by the Commission. Thus, unenforceable, vague and lacking
economic rationale rules would have to be enshrined in the
Constitution. 
MS will have to set up independent institutions in charge of
verifying that the balanced budget rule and the adjustment trajec-
tory path are met. This is one more step towards full technocratic
management of fiscal policy. Will these independent institutions
be entitled to question the fiscal rule or the adjustment path if they
do not match the cyclical needs of the economy? 
Article 4 repeats the rule according to which public debts
should come down below 60% of GDP. This rule was already part
of the SGP, but the Commission could not impose it. Thus, a
country running a higher than 60% of GDP debt ratio will have to
reduce this ratio by at least one twentieth of the gap with 60% each
year. This rule assumes that a 60% of GDP ratio is optimal for and
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can be reached by all countries. But in Europe, countries like Italy
or Belgium have run for a long time public debts of 100% of GDP
(without mentioning Japan where it has reached 200% of GDP),
without imbalances because these debts correspond to high
domestic households savings (see also Box 1). However, for a
country with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 90% and a nominal growth of
3% this implies that the public deficit is less than 1.115% of GDP.
Hence this does not introduce additional constraints in the
medium-term as compared to the balanced budget target. 
Box 1.  A Keynesian perspective
From a Keynesian perspective, a certain level of debt and deficit are
necessary to ensure that demand equals potential output. 
If y = g + d + cy –σr + kh, with y, GDP, g public deficit, d, private
demand, r, real interest rate, h, public debt, full stabilisation implies
that in the short-run: g = –d + σr 
If this policy is implemented and if stabilisation is perfect, there is no
link ex post between the deficit and the output gap. Let us note also that,
in this case, g, government borrowing, is considered as structural
according to the OECD or the EC methods, which makes no sense. 
In the long run, g = 0 and h = –(d – σr)/k 
The long-term public debt level is not arbitrary, but depends on
private agents’ wishes: debt must equal desired debt at the optimal
interest rate, i.e. the rate equal to the growth rate. 
This simple model shows that a fiscal rule like: g = g° –λ y – μ(h – h)
cannot be proposed, since it would not allow for full stabilisation and
since the government cannot set a debt target regardless of private
agents’ saving behaviour. 
According to article 5, a country under an EDP will have to
submit its budget and its structural reform programmes for
approval to the Commission and the Council who will also exert
surveillance on their implementation. This article is a new weapon
to impose liberal reforms to MS populations. A country under an
EDP has to follow the expected adjustment path for its nominal
deficit. Therefore it has to implement all the more restrictive poli-
cies than domestic growth is low.
Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak64
According to article 7, the Commission’s proposals will be auto-
matically adopted unless there is a qualified majority against them,
the country concerned not voting. Thus, in practice, the Commis-
sion will always have the last word. 
The Treaty does not introduce effective economic policy coordi-
nation, i.e. an economic strategy using monetary, tax, fiscal and
wage policies to reduce economic imbalances in the MS and to
come closer to full employment.
The Pact obliges MS to run quasi-automatic fiscal policies,
prohibiting any discretionary fiscal policy. But the latter are needed
to reach full stabilisation. Let us assume that the tax rate is 50% and
that the propensity to spend is 1; then the multiplier equals 2. If
private spending falls by 10 ex ante, GDP will fall by 20 and the
public deficit will rise by 10 without active fiscal policy response.
An active expansionary policy, which increases public spending by
10, leads to the same public deficit, but prevents the output fall.
This is prohibited by the Pact, which is based on an implicit but
wrong theory: automatic stabilisers must play, but discretionary
fiscal policies to support growth should be prohibited. 
According to the Pact, each country should run restrictive
measures without accounting for the domestic economic situation
and policies in the other MS. The Pact assumes implicitly that the
Keynesian multiplier is zero, that restrictive policies have no
impact on GDP. If we consider the situation in early 2013, this
implies that all countries should run austerity policies even if their
public deficits are due to insufficient output levels following the
burst of the financial bubble. Also, the Pact may impose austerity
policies in Europe for a long time, which will impede euro area
growth and will increase imbalances in the most vulnerable MS. 
The Commission has been pursuing its efforts to control
domestic policies, and has been trying since November 2011 to
have two new directives adopted (the Two-Pack). According to the
first one, the Commission would be entitled to criticise euro area
MS budgets before they are passed by the Parliament, and could
publicly ask for budget amendments. Fiscal policies’ supervision
will be permanent for MS under an EDP. Countries could be
requested to introduce Independent Budget Committees; budgets
should be based on independent macroeconomic forecasts.
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According to the second directive, the Commission will be entitled
to put a MS under strengthened surveillance and the Council could
impose it to request financial support. 
Some economists and even ministers in Germany or the Nether-
lands requested that a country not fulfilling the SGP may be
condemned by the European Court of Justice. Fiscal policy would
be submitted to the judiciary power. Other voices requested that
the concerned country may be deprived of structural funds or
voting rights. The ECB president had suggested that a EU Commis-
sioner be responsible of public finances in the euro area and may
control MS budgets. 
So there is a strengthening of binding and without economic
rationale fiscal rules, inconsistent with macroeconomic gover-
nance needs. This is a failure of today’s EU construction: better
economic policies coordination is necessary, but a strict numerical
constraint on public deficit levels is not economic policy coordina-
tion and goes in the wrong direction.
2) Improving economic policy coordination
In 2011 a first “European semester” was introduced, during
which MS present their fiscal plans and structural programmes to
the Commission and the European Council, who both give their
opinion before the vote in their national parliament in the second
semester of the year. Such a process could be useful if the objective
was to define an agreed economic strategy, but, in fact, this
semester increases the pressure on each MS to implement austerity
measures and liberal reforms. No agreed plans to reduce imbal-
ances between MS or to support growth have been implemented in
2012 or 2013.
The Six-Pack allows the Commission to exert surveillance on
the excessive macroeconomic imbalances in each country by
following a scoreboard of relevant variables (competitiveness,
external current account, public and private debts). A Macroeco-
nomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) has been introduced.
Recommendations will be sent out to countries running imbal-
ances. Fines may be decided. So far the Commission does not
recommend coordinated strategies to support growth or to reduce
imbalances. Until 2013, countries are criticised for running exces-
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sive public or external deficits, but not for running surpluses. In
November 2013, for the first time, the external surpluses of
Germany and Luxembourg were questioned by the Commission. 
In June 2012, the Growth and Jobs Pact could be seen as re-
orientation of the European Strategy, but it was not included in the
EU major policies. A 120 billion euros amount is mentioned, i.e.
1% of euro area GDP, but these measures apply to an undefined
time period, while fiscal consolidation policies amount to 2% of
GDP per year. The European Council decision in January 2013 to
cut the EU budget (in percentage of GDP) brought the hope of
fiscal expansionary measures to an end. 
3) Implementing some degree of financial solidarity
Financial solidarity has increased progressively since the begin-
ning of the crisis, despite the reluctance of Northern economies,
especially of Germany. However, solidarity remains conditional
and limited. In 2013, three mechanisms are in place.
The European Stability mechanism (ESM) launched in
October 2012 introduces some degree of financial solidarity
between the MS, but this solidarity is limited and has a very high
price. The ESM can lend up to 500 billion euros. It may lend to
governments or buy public debt on primary and secondary
markets. Countries may benefit from the ESM if they have adopted
the Fiscal pact and have fulfilled it. The ESM support will be condi-
tional: a country needs to commit to fulfil a drastic fiscal
adjustment programme imposed by the Troika, and will therefore
lose all domestic fiscal autonomy and have to accept a long
austerity period. The Greek example shows that this type of plan is
not the way out of the crisis. The solidarity which is being imple-
mented does not consist in donations but in loans.
The ESM debt will be considered prior to private ones. Public
bond issuance should involve a collective action clause, i.e. in case
of default, stated by the Commission and the IMF, the country will
be entitled to agree with creditors on a change in payment condi-
tions, the agreement applying to all creditors if a majority agrees.
Euro area government debts will become speculative as was the
case for developing economies, and will not be considered
anymore as a safe asset by financial institutions. The interest rate
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on public debt will rise, be more volatile and less easy to control.
Why build the euro area to reach such a situation? 
On 29 June 2012, it was agreed in the case of Spain that the ESM
will be allowed to intervene to recapitalise banks, to abandon its
status of preferred creditor and to help a country which makes the
necessary efforts, but is still under financial markets’ attack, by a
simple agreement “memorandum”.
On 6 September 2012, the ECB announced a purchasing bonds
programme on the secondary markets, for short-term bonds (1-3
years), the so-called OMT (outright monetary transactions). No
quantitative ceiling has been set. The ECB does not set a target in
terms of acceptable interest rate spreads. The ECB announces that
it will not be a preferred creditor in order to show that it takes the
same risks as private creditors. But the ECB interventions will be
subject to strict conditionality. Countries will have to agree on an
adjustment programme with the Commission and the European
Stability mechanism, the programme being coordinated by the
IMF. The ESM will support the country through buying bonds on
the primary market. Supported countries will have to make
commitments in terms of fiscal consolidation and structural
reforms. Since the bonds concerned have short-term maturities,
the ECB will be able to stop buying them if the countries
concerned do not fulfil their commitments.
Financial markets’ fear was self-fulfilling: markets were afraid
that Spain would default. Thus, they were refusing to lend to Spain
or were requesting high interest rates, which was reinforcing
default risks. Since these rates were also applying to companies,
this was contributing to deepen the recession in the country. In
putting no ceiling to its interventions, the ECB reassured markets
on default risks in the concerned countries, on the risks of a euro
area break-up. The ECB broke the spiral of self-fulfilling expecta-
tions, so that finally it did not have to intervene. Lower interest
rates can help to boost activity. Conversely, countries will have to
pursue severe austerity policies. The ECB imposes its views on the
economic strategy to be implemented. It requests product and
labour markets structural reforms; the full commitment to govern-
ment balance targets despite the recession; the rapid
implementation of the Fiscal Pact. There is a risk that austerity
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implemented simultaneously in the euro area leads the area to
remain durably in crisis. 
Although the OMT has not been used in practice, the simple
fact that it exists has been sufficient to reduce substantially interest
rates spreads to (considering the Dutch rate as a benchmark)
1.65 percentage points for Spain and 1.75 percentage points for
Italy in January 2014. But this decrease in risk premia remains
fragile. The cost of financial markets’ distrust remains heavy (more
than 2 percent of GDP for Italy). The euro area remains in perma-
nence under the threat of financial markets’ renewed defiance after
election results or the release of a fiscal imbalance.
Moreover some German economists (see Doluca et al, 2012)
consider that the ECB has gone beyond its mandate in committing
itself to support public debt in some countries, that this is not an
incentive for countries to implement the necessary reforms, and
that the ECB should focus strictly on price stability. 
In practice transfers between euro area banks are done through
the Target 2 system balances. If a country runs a current account
deficit which is not financed by capital inflows, or if it suffers from
Table 5. 10-year government interest rates
February 2012 February 2013 May 2013 January 2014
Greece 40.8 11.1 9.6 7.9
Portugal 12.3 6.9 5.5 5.1
Spain 5.05 5.15 4.2 3.7
Italy 5.5 4.45 3.9 3.8
Ireland 7.8 3.1 3.45 3.2
Belgium    3.65 2.3 2.05 2.35
France 2.95 2.2 1.85 2.2
United Kingdom 2.1 2.1 1.9 2.8
Sweden 1.8 2.0 1.8 2.4
United States 2.0 1.95 1.85 2.8
Austria 2.85 1.9 1.7 2.1
Netherlands 2.2 1.8 1.6 2.05
Finland 2.3 1.8 1.5 1.95
Germany 1.9 1.6 1.35 1.75
Japan 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.7
Source: Financial markets.
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capital flights, its banks will have an imbalance which they will be
able to finance through borrowing from the ESCB. Conversely,
countries running surpluses become lenders to the ESCB. However,
this system does not work directly for public debts, since govern-
ments have the obligation to issue debt on markets, and at
markets’ conditions. On the one hand, this mechanism guarantees
automatic financing of national banking systems; questioning it
more or less significantly would make the euro fragile, either
through introducing debt ceilings by country or higher refi-
nancing interest rates for banks in some countries. This
mechanism compensates money transfers between banks of
different countries inside the area. On the other hand, this mecha-
nism leads countries running surpluses to use their surpluses for
not very productive purposes, while Northern countries could use
their surpluses to finance foreign direct investment, or to lend to
Southern euro area countries or countries outside the euro area. It
is their choice not to do so.
4) Fiscal austerity in the euro area
In 2012, the output gap remained significantly negative in all
euro area countries. At the euro area level, the estimates varied at
Table 6. Net position in the Target 2 system
In billion euros
October 2012 November 2013
Germany 719 544
Netherlands 118 59
Luxembourg 109 103
Finland 61 67
Slovenia -4 -2
Cyprus -10 -8
Belgium -39 -10
Austria -40 -42
Portugal -70 -61
France -46 -60
Ireland -91 -57
Greece -108 -50
Italy -267 -211
Spain -380 -264
Source: ECB.
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that time from -2.2% according to the Commission, to -3.7% for
the OECD and -11% for OFCE. At the beginning of 2013, the
Commission estimated euro area potential GDP to have grown by
around 0.5% per year since 2009 (see EC Winter 2013 forecast).
Such estimates suggest that Europe has no other choice but accept
low growth and high unemployment. But there is no explanation
as to how supply factors would have induced such a reduction in
potential growth. If the only explanation is: “potential growth was
affected by effective growth”, then a growth recovery would lead to
higher potential growth. Hence the potential growth concept has
no meaning and is not useful for the conduct of economic policy.
Notwithstanding economic developments since the beginning
of the 2007 crisis, the Commission pursues its strategy: requesting
MS to maintain restrictive fiscal policies, independently of the
economic situation, and to boost growth by structural reforms.
Although this strategy failed to deliver, the Commission refuses to
change its orientations, even though partly due to them, growth
has fallen. Euro area GDP was forecast to grow by 1.8% in 2012
according to the Spring 2011 EC forecasts but turned out to fall by
0.6%; for 2013, GDP was forecast to grow by 1.3% in the Spring
2012 EC forecast, versus -0.4% in the Spring 2013 forecast (see
Table 7). It may also be noted that the EC has revised downwards
once again potential growth estimates in the recent period, for
instance for 2012: from 1.1% according to the Spring 2011 fore-
cast, to 0.8% one year ago and 0.3% in the Spring 2013 forecast. No
explanations are given for these revisions which are very surprising
as many MS did undertake the required structural reforms
supposed to increase their potential growth. 
Table 7. Euro area GDP growth forecasts, according to DG ECFIN Forecasts
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Spring 2011 1.8 1.6 1.8
Autumn 2011 1.9 1.5 0.5 1.3
Spring 2012 1.9 1.5 -0.3 1.0
Autumn 2012 2.0 1.4 -0.4 -0.1 1.4
Winter 2013 2.0 1.4 -0.6 -0.3 1.4
Spring 2013 2.0 1.4 -0.6 -0.4 1.2
Source: European Economic Forecast, European Economy, European Commission.
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Under the pressure of financial markets, of the European
Commission (and of the Troika as concerns Greece, Ireland, and
Portugal), all euro area MS have implemented fiscal consolidation
policies starting from either 2010 or 2011. According to our esti-
mates based on pre-crisis trend output and on the latest EC
Forecast, these policies amount on average to around 1.7% of GDP
in 2011, 2.0% in 2012 and 1.1% in 2013 (see Table 8). From 2010
to 2014, the cumulated negative fiscal impulse will reach about
24.5% of GDP in Greece, 14% of GDP in Portugal, 12% in Ireland
and in Spain. Fiscal tightening weighs mainly on the expenditure
side: 80% at the euro area level, with two exceptions, Belgium and
France, where tax increases are more substantial. 
Table 9 shows the impacts of the tightening fiscal plans as
described in Table 8, using a small model. The model accounts for
the “direct impact” of these policies, on the basis of domestic
multipliers (slightly above 1 for the larger economies). It also
accounts for the impact through external demand of fiscal plans
announced in the euro area countries, the UK, the US and Japan
Table 8. Fiscal impulses
In % of GDP 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total Spending Receipts
DEU 1.5 -1.4 -1.2 -0.4 0.0 -1.5 -1.4 0.1
FRA -0.5 -1.8 -1.5 -1.4 -0.8 -6.0 -2.1 3.9
ITA -0.7 -1.2 -3.3 -1.2 -0.7 -7.1 -5.5 1.6
ESP -2.6 -2.2 -4.3 -2.2 -0.7 -12.0 -11.2 0.8
NLD -0.6 -1.3 -1.8 -1.7 -1.4 -6.8 -4.2 1.6
BEL -1.3 -0.1 -1.9 -0.7 -0.4 -4.4 -1.4 3.0
AUT 0.3 -1.7 -0.2 -0.9 0.0 -2.5 -2.0 0.5
PRT 0.8 -6.1 -3.5 -3.7 -1.8 -14.3 -12.4 1.9
FIN 0.1 -1.9 -0.9 -1.7 -0.8 -5.2 -3.8 1.4
IRL -3.8 -2.0 -2.1 -3.0 -1.3 -12.2 -12.5 0.2
GRC -8.4 -6.8 -4.5 -2.5 -2.2 -24.4 -17.5 6.9
EUZ -0.7 -1.7 -2.0 -1.1 -0.8 -6.3 -4.5 1.8
GBR -1.8 -2.7 -0.3 -0.9 -1.3 -7.0 -5.9 1.1
USA 0.1 -2.0 -1.1 -2.1 -1.2 -6.3 -4.1 2.2
JPN 0.4 -0.5 0.5 0.4 -2.0 -1.2 -1.0 0.2
Explanatory note: Fiscal impulses are calculated as changes in structural primary balances, based on pre-crisis trend
GDP growth. 
Source: Authors’ estimates.
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(the global multiplier is 1.4). It assumes that interest rates will not
be affected as these restrictive policies will not improve strongly
debt ratios. The cumulated negative GDP impact would reach 8.0
percentage points for the euro area, but 16 percentage points in
Spain, 17 percentage points in Portugal, 32 percentage points in
Greece. The ex-ante favourable impact of restrictive fiscal policies
on public balances would be strongly reduced by this depressive
effect. The public debt-to-GDP ratio would increase in many coun-
tries, due to the strong fall in output.
Countries having to implement restrictive fiscal policies suffer
from large output falls and high unemployment. In such circum-
stances, government deficit targets are not met, which will justify
additional restrictive measures, etc. Each quarter, governments are
required to introduce additional austerity measures, mainly cuts
in social and public expenditures, which depress consumption
and activity.
Before the crisis, the development of neo-classical or DSGE
models at the expense of old Keynesian models, in particular in
Table 9. Fiscal impulse impacts on GDP, public deficit, and public debt 2011-2013
GDP growth in %
Public 
balance
% of GDP
Public 
debt
% of GDP
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 2014 2014
DEU 1.2 -1.7 -1.6 -0.7 -0.2 -3.0 +0.2 +2.6
FRA -0.7 -2.4 -2.2 -1.9 -0.8 -8.0 +1.6 +2.2
ITA -0.9 -1.8 -4.0 -1.6 -1.0 -9.3 +2.6 +3.8
ESP -3.1 -3.2 -5.65 -3.0 -1.1 -16.1 +4.8 -0.7
NLD -0.55 -1.3 -1.8 -1.7 -1.2 -6.3 +3.6 -3.2
BEL -1.0 -0.5 -1.8 -0.85 -0.5 -4.7 +2.0 -2.2
AUT 0.35 -1.9 -0.7 -1.0 -0.1 -3.4 +0.8 0.0
PRT 0.4 -6.7 -4.4 -4.2 -2.0 -16.9 +6.7 +2.1
FIN 0.0 -2.0 -0.9 -1.7 -0.8 -5.4 +2.3 -2.6
IRL -3.1 -2.0 -3.0 -2.6 -1.2 -11.9 +7.4 -9.7
GRC -9.2 -7.9 -9.5 -3.1 -2.6 -32.3 +9.9 +12.6
EUZ -0.7 -2.25 -2.9 -1.4 -0.8 -8.0 +2.3 +0.7
GBR -2.15 -3.5 -1.0 -1.45 -1.7 -9.8 +2.6 -0.2
Explanatory note: The fiscal impulses, as shown in Table 7, reduce euro area GDP growth by 0.7% en 2010, …,
0.8% in 2014. In 2014, the cumulated impact on euro area GDP is -8.0%; the public balance is improved by
2.3 percentage points of GDP, but the debt/ratio increases by 0.7 percentage point. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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international institutions (IMF, ECB, EC) spread out the idea that
the fiscal multiplier is very low, even in a rather closed economy,
in the order of 0.5 in the short-term and nil after 2-3 years. In
many of these models, restrictive policies do not have any detri-
mental impact on output, thanks to three assumptions (see also
Creel et al., 2005). Households anticipate that a permanent decline
in public expenditure will reduce their taxes in the future and
therefore they immediately increase their consumption, which
offsets the decline in public expenditure (Barro-Ricardian effect).
Sometimes, the expected decline in taxes leads households to
anticipate that labour supply (and then GDP) will increase: the rise
in consumption is higher than the cut in public spending, which
induces a negative multiplier. The economy is always operating at
full capacity, or very close to it, thanks to price flexibility and
monetary policy: a decline in output would induce a strong fall in
inflation, and then a strong decline in interest rates which
supports activity.
The crisis has shown that the output level depends on the
demand level, that a strong decrease in demand, like in 2008, is
not offset by automatic mechanisms. Economists (and interna-
tional institutions) have re-discovered that the Keynesian
multiplier is large, in the order of 1 to 1.5; that the multiplier is
larger in a situation of high unemployment than when the
economy operates at full capacity (but why implementing a fiscal
stimulus in a full employment situation?); that the multiplier is
higher for public consumption, investment and social transfers
than for tax cuts.2
In the historical expansionary-fiscal consolidation episodes,
described by some economists, restrictive fiscal policies where
accompanied by elements which are not available today for euro
area MS, such as exchange rate depreciation, interest rates cuts,
increase in private borrowing thanks to financial deregulation, or a
strong rise in private demand due to economic shocks (such as
joining the EU). 
In a depressed economic situation, restrictive fiscal measures
have no impact on inflation and interest rates. Barro-Ricardian
2. See repentance papers: Coenen et al. (2012); Holland and Portes (2012); IMF, World Economic
Outlook (October 2012); Blanchard and Leigh (2013).
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effects are unlikely in this context since austerity measures reduce
households’ incomes, since liquidity constraints are heavy on
firms and households, since banks will not lend massively to
private sectors in a low-growth/high uncertainty situation, and
since austerity strategies imply that governments consider that
potential output growth will be durably lower, which contributes
to depress investment. There is no certainty that risk premia will
decrease since public debt ratios will not decrease substantially and
since fiscal policies implemented make the euro area fragile and
worries markets. In a depressed situation, high unemployment
puts downwards pressure on wages, which lowers households’
incomes and thus their consumption. Low wages do not strongly
increase profits because the fall in demand induces overstaffing.
Higher profits do not induce firms to invest, given the weakness of
production perspectives. No country benefits from competitive-
ness gains if the depression hits the whole area. 
In his 13 February 2013 letter,3 Olli Rehn, the vice-president of
the European Commission refuses to recognise that fiscal multi-
pliers are stronger than the Commission considered. He pretends
that the euro area depression results more from the high interest
rates imposed by financial markets than from the restrictive fiscal
policy imposed by the EC. It is difficult to see how this can apply to
the French case or, outside Europe, to the US for instance. In any
case, the EU authorities have not taken the strong measures needed
to restore the unity of MS debts. Olli Rehn refuses to recognise that
consolidation policies should be stopped in times of economic
recession, even if he accepts that they can be slowed down. He
does not see that the increase in public debt may be necessary if
the private sector wants to reduce its debt. Austerity policies failed
to reassure financial markets. Structural reforms have not offset the
impact of consolidation policies. Olli Rehn claims that current
restrictive policies will enhance medium-term growth, but the risk
is that the euro area never ends with the current depression and
never reaches this medium term. 
Policies aiming at reducing the social security system are
socially and economically dangerous. They increase households’
savings rates. It is a paradox that the crisis caused by financial
3. See http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/rehn/documents/cab20130213_en.pdf
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markets will lead to oblige households to use financial markets for
retirement and health insurance purposes. It would be disastrous
for Europe that the European authorities use the threat of financial
markets to impose on citizens restrictive economic policies, liberal
reforms and substantial social spending cuts.
In addition, there is big risk that fiscal austerity undermines the
effort required to support future growth (research, education,
health, infrastructure, family policy), to enhance the growth
potential, to help the European industry to maintain current activ-
ities and develop innovative and green sectors.
Can fiscal exit strategy ignore the causes of the crisis? The crisis
is due to growth strategies based on downwards pressure on wages
and social benefits. The fall in demand was offset by competitive-
ness gains in neo-mercantilist countries, by rising financial and
real estate bubbles and households borrowing in Anglo-Saxon and
Southern Europe countries. The failure of these two strategies has
forced to use public deficits to support growth. Reducing public
deficits requires the implementation of another growth strategy
based, on the one hand on wages and social incomes distribution,
on the other hand on a new industrial policy, on implementing
and financing investment geared towards an environmentally
sustainable economy. Before the crisis, public finances also
suffered from tax evasion and tax competition. Restoring public
finances requires to combat tax evasion and tax havens, to raise
taxes on the financial sector, on higher incomes and wealth.
3.1.  Towards a real and deep economic and monetary union? 
The proposals made by the Commission in November 2012 in A
blue print for a deep and genuine monetary and economic and monetary
union suggest new steps towards federalism: 
— “All major economic and fiscal policy choices by a MS should
be subject to deeper coordination, endorsement and surveil-
lance process at the EU level”. The possibility of different
economic or social strategies is forgotten or prohibited.
— The needs for strengthened fiscal discipline and for ex ante
fiscal coordination are asserted. But, after the fiscal pact,
what remains to be coordinated since all fiscal policies have
to be run in autopilot mode?
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— The Commission wants to have the power to suspend
programmes payments to MS not taking the corrective
action that the Commission requires. 
— The euro area could have a fiscal power to absorb asymmetric
shocks (with is rather ironic once national governments
have been deprived of the ability to implement specific fiscal
policies). 
— The EMU could be entitled to support structural reforms, i.e.
to have a “convergence and competitiveness instrument”,
within the pseudo “golden rule” framework, i.e. balanced
budgets. A country could sign an agreement with the
Commission, according to which it would implement struc-
tural reforms (concerning, according to the Commission, the
performance of labour and products markets, the efficiency
of the public sector, employment and social inclusion, ...)
and would therefore get a financial reward from other MS.
But can we imagine that a country would get subsidies in
order to abolish its minimum wage, or its public pensions
system? Can we imagine that France would have to pay to
subsidise the implementation of such measures in Spain or
in Italy? Can we even imagine a country to agree to finance
vocational training or education programmes in another
MS ?4  
— The Commission wants to be able to oblige a MS to revise its
national budget or to change its budget execution. 
— The Commission considers the possibility for the euro area
to have its own resources and to issue bonds.
— Short-term debts (Eurobills) could be mutualised under a
EMU Treasury.
— A common European Redemption Fund (ERF) could be intro-
duced to amortise public debts, with strict conditionality
(see below). 
— The role of the vice-president of the Commission in charge
of economic and social affairs in the euro area should be
strengthened; he will be in charge of the euro area Treasury;
4. Faced with the reluctance of many MS, the European Council of 19-20 December 2013
indicated that these “mutually agreed contractual arrangements” will be concluded between
voluntary MS; they will not introduce obligations for non-participating countries; they will not
become an income equalization tool.
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a Euro Committee should be settled in the European Parlia-
ment, the Euro-Group should be strengthened. 
— The proposal to issue euro-bonds guaranteed by all MS or by
the ECB has not been considered. Germany refuses to make
unlimited and unconditional commitments to support the
other MS. But how to strengthen the euro area without such
commitments?
Many questions remain: 
— Can we imagine all major economic and social decisions
being made at the EU level, by the Commission without
accounting for national votes and debates? Such a denial of
democracy would rapidly be sanctioned by citizens through
votes in favour of anti-European parties. 
— Can we image a federal power able to account for domestic
specificities in a Europe made of heterogeneous countries?
Can we imagine a single policy implemented in different
countries? Or different policies implemented through a
central process? These are probably two impossible ways. 
We do not think that EU powers should be strengthened as long
as the EU works as it currently does, as long as the EU does not
implement a growth strategy, as long as it remains focused on
liberal structural reforms, on public expenditure cuts and on
absurd public finance criteria. EU institutions must show first that
they can implement an efficient strategy before peoples and MS
agree to enlarge their power. 
3.2. Can the Euro be achieved? A recent French proposal.
The French “Economic Analysis Council” (Conseil d’analyse
économique, CAE, 2013) recognises the euro area institutional weak-
nesses, but believes that this can be addressed by increasing its
technocratic, federalist and liberal features. 
Hence, the CAE proposes to set up an independent European
Fiscal Committee. The latter would coordinate national committees,
would set limits to MS public government deficits, and so would be
a new technocratic institution which would reduce further MS
autonomy. The CAE does not find it useful to specify the objective
of the Committee: a growth strategy or the arbitrary norm of the
Fiscal Treaty? This Committee should alert the European Court of
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Justice (should fiscal policy be set by the judiciary power?); his
proposals should be validated by a euro area European Parliament.
The CAE recognises that fiscal consolidation policies have
strong recessive effects, before suggesting looking for growth
through structural reforms, albeit recognising that such measures
are “politically costly”. This is the strategy which has failed to
deliver over the last 12 years. Labour market rigidity is of course
responsible for weak growth. The CAE naively proposes that each
worker in each country can “freely” choose a European employ-
ment contract, more flexible than the domestic one, in exchange
of a European unemployment insurance, which would come on
top of the national unemployment insurance. This proposal lacks
realism. The CAE proposes to introduce a transfer system between
countries, built on the difference between the unemployment rate
of each country and their structural rate of unemployment. But
how will the structural rate of unemployment be assessed? 
The CAE proposes to offset the balanced budget requirement by
setting up a euro area budget, which could be allowed to run
cyclical imbalances. But how will it work in the case of specific
shocks? The lessons of the 2007-2009 crisis are not drawn: MS
should be able to let automatic stabilisers play and to make discre-
tionary decisions, without having a constraint based on a
structural balance impossible to measure, without having to wait
for European financial support based on non- measurable concepts
(structural deficit or structural unemployment).
3.3. Another federalist view
Aglietta and Brand (2013) recall that a State must have the
ability to monetize its debt. The euro area must go back to the prin-
ciple: one currency, one State. Rather than the dissolution of the
euro, they offer a fiscal and political union in Europe. The euro
area needs to organize fiscal transfers and to put an end to autono-
mous fiscal policies. They propose to create a European Fiscal
Institute (EFI): a “chimera” involving parliamentarians and offi-
cials from European countries. They assign two contradictory roles
to the EFI. The EFI would implement an anti-crisis policy (expan-
sionary fiscal policies in Northern countries, European investment
in Southern countries); the EFI would coordinate fiscal policies
“according to a criterion of public debt long term consolidation”.
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But this long-term criterion does not define the policies effectively
implemented each year. The EFI would manage the MS common
policies. But the extent of these common policies is unclear. “The
EFI should deal with the content of the fiscal union, so with poli-
cies to achieve a sustainable consolidation of public finances”, as if
fiscal policy was restricted to consolidation. “We must commit to a
medium-term programme to keep public finances on a sustainable
path… Fiscal consolidation requests two decades”. The authors
recognise that fiscal policy should have a stabilising role, but they
draw no consequences of this role for the fiscal policies framework.
They do not give evidence that a common budgetary policy can be
implemented between countries with different economic situa-
tions and strategies. 
Later, the authors offer another mechanism: in each MS, an
independent fiscal committee will assess the sustainability of fiscal
policy; these committees would work in harmony with the EFI.
Domestic fiscal policy would be based on a five-year law with
macroeconomic assumptions provided by the fiscal committee.
The EFI would assess the consistency of national projects. The
European Parliament would make binding recommendations. The
EFI would publish public debt ratings to financial markets (which
is inconsistent with the proposal according to which the ECB
should guarantee MS public debts). It is difficult to understand
who would be the ultimate decision-maker between the EFI, the
European Parliament and national Governments. The project is
based on a myth: a European body could set fiscal policies for each
MS, even if these policies must be differentiated.
The ECB would intervene to set an upper limit on the interest
rate on the public debt of countries in difficulty. The authors
propose to differentiate monetary policy by country, but they do
not provide the differentiation criteria: would a country in reces-
sion with a large public debt have a lower interest rate (to support
its activity and to reduce its debt burden) or a stronger rate (to
facilitate government bonds selling)? Is differentiation possible if
public debts are guaranteed? Finally, the authors propose to issue
eurobonds with an insurance premium to impose high-risk coun-
tries to pursue a consolidation strategy and to reward low-risk
countries for the protection they bring to others. The rate will
depend on fiscal adjustment progresses. There again, there is no
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critical analysis on fiscal adjustment and consolidation notions:
should a country be punished for running a fiscal deficit in times
of recession?
3.4. Towards fiscal federalism?
Since the Fiscal Pact prevents in theory MS to implement stabili-
sation fiscal policies, some economists and the Commission have
proposed to implement at the European level a system of transfers
between MS to ensure that countries in good economic situation
finance the MS in depression (see European Commission, 2013). In
the spirit of these promoters, this system should avoid permanent
transfers, each country should alternatively be paying or receiving
transfer. Some (like Enderlein et al., 2013) propose to base these
transfers on output gap differentials, since, for a given country, the
sum of output gaps is nil, by construction, over a long time period,
forgetting that it is a vague concept, with a questionable and vari-
able over time measurement: should there be refunds whenever
the Commission revises its estimates? Should a country in depres-
sion wait for European funds to support its output and,
meanwhile, run a restrictive pro-cyclical policy? Some propose the
unification of unemployment allowance systems, since they are
pro-cyclical public expenditure, but national systems are currently
very diverse and are often managed by social partners. The unem-
ployment concept should be standardised (what about vocational
training, disability pensions, or early retirement beneficiaries?). A
country having made efforts to reduce its unemployment rate will
refuse to pay for high unemployment rates countries, and will
blame the latter for not having undertaken the necessary reforms.
Others propose transfers between countries based on differences in
unemployment rates levels or variations: this raises the same prob-
lems. The proposed transfers are generally of small size and vanish
if depression is widespread. According to us, MS do no need fiscal
federalism, but they need to regain full freedom to undertake stabi-
lization fiscal policies.
4. Redemption? 
Public debts in advanced economies have strongly risen during
the crisis (Table 1). This results from the depth of the crisis itself
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and not from over-expansionary fiscal policies which would have
been implemented before or during the crisis, except in the case of
Greece. There is no reason to exert redemption for implemented
policies. The rise in public debts was implicitly desired (by house-
holds who wish to own safe assets, who do not want to bear
financial markets risks while companies wish to deleverage), it is
useless to try and reimburse debt as long as the factors which have
caused the debt to rise remain. Given the current interest rates
levels on public debt for major countries, it cannot be said that the
public debt level induces any rise in interest rates.
The rise in public debt increases the risk that public finances
will be under financial markets supervision in the years to come.
But this supervision is not satisfactory: financial markets have no
macroeconomic perspective; they are pro-cyclical (they will
impose efforts in bad times); their opinions are self-fulfilling which
they are aware of; they do not try to incorporate all relevant piece
of information, but mainly the piece of information which are “in
the mood of time”; they are schizophrenic, they request consolida-
tion and growth policies at the same time. They have their own
judgement on the needed appropriate economic policy, but is this
necessarily the relevant one? There is a big risk that MS set the
objective of trying to escape financial markets’ surveillance in
cutting too rapidly and too massively government borrowing
which would postpone the economic recovery indefinitely. MS
ability to run active fiscal policies will be reduced. What would
have happened if countries had refused to rescue banks in 2009, in
order to avoid them to borrow on financial markets? Can financial
markets be given the responsibility to assess public debt sustain-
ability and the usefulness of public deficits? 
Two strategies can be implemented today. We advocate for a
first strategy: the possibility to run fiscal stabilisation policies
should be maintained (or rather re-established), monetary policy
should remain expansionary, public debt guarantee by the ECB
should allow to bring interest rates down to 2% in all euro area
countries; wages should be increased in countries where the wage
share in value added has substantially decreased; specific measures
designed to support both public and private investment, as part of
the environmental transition should be implemented. The debt-to-
GDP ratio will fall thanks to growth recovery.
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The second strategy consists in setting a binding agenda in
terms of debt-to-GDP ratios with a view to bring the ratios back to
their pre-crisis levels (see IMF, 2010). This raises three issues: it
requests a substantial negative fiscal shock, which will be substan-
tial in the first years in order to be in line with the requested
strategy, but such a shock leads GDP to fall which leads debt to rise
(see Box 2). The debt reduction path is inconsistent with short
term fiscal stabilisation needs, and may lead the commitment to be
out of reach, or at a very high cost. There is no guarantee that the
final debt ratio target, set a priori, is consistent with macroeco-
nomic equilibrium. 
Box 2.  The public debt norm in the short run
Let us consider an economy in a Keynesian situation. Output is deter-
mined by demand as: y = g + c(1–t)y, where t is the tax rate. Debt varies
as:h = h0 + g – ty. If g falls by 1, y falls by 1/1–c(1–t). A restrictive policy
will lead the debt ratio to rise if: h0 / y0 > (1–c)(1–t).
For instance if c=0.5 et t=0.5, h0 = y0 = 100, cutting the public deficit
by 1 will lead output to fall by 1.33 (from 100 down to 98.67), ex post the
deficit will fall by 0.33. Debt will fall down to 99.67. The debt-to-GDP
ratio will rise from 100% to 101%. In the short term the debt-to-GDP
ratio cannot be cut through a restrictive policy.         
The German Council of economic experts (2012) suggested the
introduction of a European Redemption Pact, i.e. to set a redemp-
tion fund (RF) in order to guarantee the repayment of the share of
the debt above 60% of GDP. Countries where debt exceeds 60% of
GDP (Germany, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Spain, France, Malta
and the Netherlands), at the exception of countries under an
adjustment programme (Greece, Ireland, and Portugal), would
place in the redemption fund the share of their debt over 60% of
GDP and, in counterpart, would transfer tax revenues allowing for
a debt repayment over 25 years. France, for instance, would thus be
able to transfer a debt share amounting to 27% of GDP, transfer-
ring revenues of 1.3% of GDP. Countries would transfer guarantees
to the fund, like some part of their gold resources. Moreover, they
would have to implement structural reforms programmes. This
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would reassure markets, who would agree to own this debt at an
interest rate below current market rates (the authors consider a 4%
interest rate, which is pessimistic since France borrowed in
February 2013 at 2.3% for 10-year government bonds). Besides,
countries should commit to the Fiscal Pact, i.e. bring rapidly their
structural deficit to 0.5% of GDP. Thus the debt ratio would rapidly
fall: in 2035, it would stand at 58.5% in Belgium (against 97%
today), 53.5% in France (against 88%), 50% in Germany (against
82%), 60% in Italy (against 120%). However, countries would
commit to strongly restrictive policies in 2012-2015, amounting
to, according to the authors’ calculations, 6.3% of GDP for Spain,
4.2% for France, 4% for the Netherlands.
The paper assumes that the Pact will allow interest rates to fall,
as compared to a catastrophic basis scenario, where countries
would implement similar austerity measures, while markets would
continue to request high interest rates. Thus, it can be claimed that
RF would have expansionary effects as compared to the cata-
strophic basis scenario. But it does not draw any lesson from the
effects on past austerity policies on output, assuming implicitly
that the fiscal multiplier is nil. What will happen if MS are unable
to cut the public deficit by as much as initially requested, due to
the impact of these generalized restrictive policies on growth and
on fiscal revenues? The German Council of economic experts’
paper does not consider the possibility that Europe goes through
economic slowdown episodes in the next 25 years, which may
require to soften restrictive policies and to abandon the Fiscal pact.
What would happen then with the redemption pact? MS fiscal
policies would have to negotiate their fiscal policy with the RF, in
addition to the Commission and Council monitoring. During the
RF existence, the coexistence of national debts with the RF debt
will allow speculation on the capacity of individual MS to fulfil
their commitments.  
The Pact does not question the factors which led public debts to
rise. Are these sins that MS have to pay for? Or were these increases
necessary because of the economic crisis? And how to be sure that,
in some future, another crisis will not require public deficits and
higher public debts?  
We do not see what a redemption pact would add to the fiscal
pact, since the fiscal pact already implies public deficits to be cut to
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0.5% of GDP as long as debt is higher than 60% of GDP, 1% if debt
falls below 60% of GDP, which, assuming a potential nominal
growth rate of 3% per year would already lead the debt-to-GDP
ratio to converge towards 33%.
On December 2012, the Commission Communication (2012)
envisages the creation of such a fund, although its annex 3 criti-
cizes its principle (in particular, a temporary fund cannot solve a
structural issue: the integration of euro area government bond
markets). On 12 march 2013, nevertheless, the EU parliament
agreed to vote the “Two-Pack” in exchange of a commitment of
the European Commission to settle a high level experts group to
assess the feasibility of such a European Redemption Pact. There is
a risk that new a priori constraints on fiscal policies are thus added. 
4.1. The eurobonds and debt agency proposals 
The euro area needs to choose between two frameworks: relying
on markets to implement fiscal discipline or introducing measures
to re-establish the unity of public debts. The first option has several
drawbacks: maintaining interest rates spreads in Europe for an
undefined time period, undermining the impact of fiscal policies
and letting financial markets play an excessive role. On the one
hand, Europe would declare that: the Greek case was an exception,
from now on, no euro area country will default. On the other
hand, it would rely on markets to judge how serious this commit-
ment is. The second option can be implemented in two ways:
either through an ECB guarantee of always refinancing public
debts or by issuing eurobonds. It requires an issue to be settled first:
according to which criteria and up to which level can a MS public
debt be guaranteed by its partners? Several projects have not
entirely made a choice between the two frameworks. 
The simplest solution consists in introducing a European debt
agency (EDA) which would be in charge of issuing a common debt
for all euro area countries. This debt would be guaranteed by all
euro area countries; it would be considered as a safe asset by finan-
cial markets; it would be very liquid, with a wide market, hence it
could be issued at low interest rates. The difficult point is that the
EDA council would supervise domestic fiscal policies and would be
entitled to deny financing too lax countries, which would then
have to issue bonds on markets. The EDA would raise the same
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problems as the SGP. What would be its assessment criteria? What
would be the democratic and economic legitimacy of its Council?
How would the EDA decide that a country runs an excessive deficit,
if the country considers that such a deficit is necessary to support
activity (like in Germany and France in 2002-2005) or to rescue
banks? Would it implement strict rules (a country would be entitled
to loans from the EDA up to 60% of its GDP) or softer ones? The
EDA would benefit neither virtuous countries (which have no diffi-
culty to get financing) nor countries in difficulty, which the EDA
would refuse to finance and which would have to issue domestic
bonds, without any European guarantee, without any potential
financing from the ECB, in other words risky assets, bearing a high
interest rate. The EDA makes sense only if it accepts to consider all
public debts, but then what to do against lax countries? 
Delpla and von Weisäcker (2010) have suggested the introduc-
tion of a “blue debt, collectively issued and guaranteed, with a
ceiling at 60% of GDP”. Each year, national parliaments will have
to vote on new public debt issuance (which means that the
German parliament would have to agree on the French deficit for
instance and vice versa). Each MS would also be allowed to issue a
red debt under its own responsibility. Since such a red debt would
bear a high interest rate, this would be a strong disincentive to
issue public debt above 60% of GDP. This proposal would generate
permanent tensions between euro area MS if each country has to
make judgements on their neighbour’s deficits. It is almost similar
to the EDA proposal and does not account for economic stabilisa-
tion needs. The 60% level is arbitrary and breached in 2013 by 10
of the original euro area MS (except Luxembourg and Finland). The
gap between blue and red debts would allow financial markets to
speculate in permanence. De Grauwe (2012) suggested than each
country would have to pay a different interest rate on its blue debt,
according to its debt level, as if public debt was always a sin which
must be punished. 
Palley (2011) suggests creating a European public finance
authority, which would issue eurobonds and lend to governments.
Thus, a limited part of the debt would be mutualised. The ECB
would be able to buy such bonds in order to influence the interest
rate level. The euro area Council of finance ministers would decide
on debt issuance. What would be the assessment criteria? Besides,
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countries would still issue national bonds, which would be subject
to financial markets’ moods.
Schulmeister (2013) suggests introducing a European Monetary
fund (EMF) which would finance member states though issuing
eurobonds guaranteed by the MS and the ECB. The EMF would
maintain long-term interest rates slightly below GDP growth. Each
MS financing would not be subject to a numerical constraint, but
would be decided within the EMF by the MS Finance ministers.
The same questions may be raised again. This project hands over to
finance ministers the responsibility of agreeing on public deficit
targets for each country, which is problematic (what should be
done in case of macroeconomic strategies divergences between
countries?), not democratic (each finance minister would impose
to its national Parliament the fulfilment of the target set at the
European level), difficult to implement (what to do in case of a
specific or global shocks?).
4.2. Can the single currency contradictions be overcome? 
For developed countries, the system which worked until 1999
lied on unity between the government, the central bank and
commercial banks. The central bank is the lender of last resort for
the government and banks. The government guarantees banks; it
can issue unlimited public debt. This debt is considered as safe and
benefits from as low as possible market interest rates. Of course this
unity was to some extent undermined by the independence of the
central bank, which could have generated conflicts between the
government (caring about supporting output or specific spending)
and the central bank (caring about maintaining low inflation).
These conflicts could have led public finances to become unsus-
tainable (see, for instance, Sterdyniak et al., 1994). But such
situations did not occur before 2007. They did never question
government solvency. 
The introduction of the euro area led to a particularly difficult
situation. On the one hand, countries need to run more active
fiscal policies because they have lost control over their interest
rates and exchange rates. It can also be added that, since 1973, the
macroeconomic equilibrium has been requiring a certain level of
public deficit and debt. Each country needs to run some
equilibrium government deficits. The 2007 crisis strengthened this
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need. On the other hand, due to the single currency, current
imbalances in one country affect the other countries of the area.
Therefore excessive deficits (or surpluses) should be avoided. What
is acceptable in the national framework where some “instinctive”
solidarity prevails is no more acceptable at the EU level, where
citizens from Northern countries have no spontaneous solidarity
with unemployed people in Southern economies, where most EU
citizens have no solidarity with Spanish, Irish, UK or Cypriot
banks. Last, financial markets’ functioning makes it necessary for
public debts to become safe assets again, while at the same time
Northern countries deny to give unlimited guarantee to their
partners. Europe is also paralysed by the German constitutional
court decision, which forbids any guarantee not expressively
agreed by the German Parliament. 
The solution adopted so far by Europe, i.e. the Fiscal pact
consists in ensuring solidarity to countries agreeing to implement
an absurd fiscal rule: keeping structural deficits below 0.5% of
GDP. But such a target is not optimal, and there is no certainty that
it can be reached.
Euro area countries should be able again to issue safe sovereign
debt, at an interest rate controlled by the ECB. They should be able
to run a public deficit in line with their macroeconomic stabilisa-
tion needs. 
Public debt mutual guarantee by the ECB or by eurobonds must
be entire for countries accepting to submit their economic policies
to a coordination process. Therefore the procedures implemented
since 2010 should be reviewed and their aims should be modified. 
Economic policy coordination cannot consist in fulfilling auto-
matic rules (like the SGP rules), and so a coordination process needs
to be organised between MS. Coordination should target GDP
growth and full employment; it should account for all economic
variables; countries should follow an economic policy strategy
allowing to meet the inflation target (at least to remain within a
target of around 2%), to meet an objective in terms of wage devel-
opments (in the medium-run real wages should grow in line with
labour productivity), in the short-run adjustment processes should
be implemented by countries where wages have risen too rapidly,
or not sufficiently; increases or cuts in social contributions may be
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used to facilitate the adjustment process; countries should
announce and negotiate their current account balance targets;
countries with high external surpluses targets should agree to lower
them or to finance explicitly industrial projects in Southern econo-
mies. The process should always reach a unanimous agreement on
a coordinated but differentiated strategy. As shown in Box 3, it is
not so easy to define such a strategy. Public deficits resulting from
this process should be financed through debt issuance guaranteed
by all euro area countries and by the ECB. The Treaty needs to
maintain an effective process in the event where no agreement is
reached. In that case, the new debt issued by countries outside the
agreement would not be guaranteed, but such a case should never
occur. Europe’s survival requires that the European project
becomes popular again, therefore is a source of growth, social prog-
ress and solidarity. It is only within this framework that
institutional progresses could be made.
Box 3.  Fiscal policy in a closed or in an open economy
1) Let us consider first a closed economy. The IS equation is:,
y = g + d – σr with y, the output gap, r, the interest rate (in difference
with the rate of growth), d, private demand, g, public demand. The
optimal fiscal policy after a purely demand shock is therefore to main-
tain: g = –d and r = 0. The government balance should offset private
demand shocks.
If households are Ricardian and offset any increase in the public
deficit by lowering their consumption, then the economy cannot be
stabilised: 
y = g + d – σr  with  d = d0 – λg  and  λ = 1
The same applies if markets request excessive risk premia: 
y = g + d – σr  with  r = r0 + μg  and  μ > 1/σ
Households’ or markets’ expectations on fiscal policies being ineffi-
cient are then self-fulfilling.
2) Let us now consider an open economy. The equilibrium in the
goods market and the trade balance are written as: 
y = g + d – σr + b   b = n(y* – y) –nδ (w – s – w*)+ b0,
with w, the wage level, s the exchange rate.
The country should have a trade balance target, bI. A small country in
the world does not have to worry about its partners’ balance. It should
therefore implement:
g = –d –bI   w – s = w* + (b0 – bI) /nδ
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If the country wishes to run a trade balance in surplus, it must cut
public spending and the level of its wages, either through exchange rate
depreciation or through a period of high unemployment.
3) Let us now consider a monetary union with two countries. The
model is written as:
y1 = g1 + d1 – σr + b
y2 = g2 + d2 – σr – b
b = n(y2 – y1) + nδ (w2 – w1)
In the event of a domestic demand shock, each country must be able
to stabilise domestic output using fiscal policy. If the interest rate is at
its optimal level, fiscal stabilisation is a better strategy than monetary
policy, as the shock is specific. If demand is excessive in Spain, Spain
should implement a restrictive fiscal policy rather than having the ECB
raising its rate, implying that Germany would need to run an expan-
sionary fiscal policy.
The problem is the compatibility between the current account targets
of the two countries. If country 1 targets a trade surplus, while country 2
aims at maintaining full employment, this leads to the pre-2007 crisis
situation: Germany cut domestic wages and demand in order to reach a
certain level of external surplus, which meant that Spain had to raise its
domestic demand.
d1 = –bI ;  d2 = bI ; w2 – w1 = bI / nδ.
No equilibrium can be reached if Spain wishes to run a current
account in balance.
Conversely, a country can choose to run a trade deficit, imposing his
partner to run a surplus which needs to be offset by a restrictive fiscal
policy.
Fiscal policy coordination is required, but trade balances (and not the
public deficit) should be the target and the wage level would be the
instrument.
4) Let us now consider a monetary Union consisting of two countries
in the world. The model is written as:
y1 = g1 + d1 – σr + b1
b1 = n(y2 – y1) + m(y* – y1) + nδ (w2 – w1) + mδ(w* – s – w1)
y2 = g2 + d2 – σr + b2
b2 = n(y1 – y2) + m(y* – y2) + nδ (w1 – w2) + mδ(w* – s – w2)
Let us assume that country 1 wishes to run some trade surplus. It will
therefore cut domestic wages. Its trade surplus will be achieved on the
rest of the world and on country 2. Country 2 will therefore have to
choose between running permanently a certain deficit and lowering its
domestic wages. This contributes to insufficient demand at the world
level. 
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